Professor Chalom Schirman, Head of the International MBA published the following opinion on the China-Iran Treaty of cooperation signed at the end of March 2021:
Evaluating the China-Iran Treaty impact and scope
This Treaty caused more ink to flow in Western and Israeli newspapers than in Chinese or even Iranian ones and it stems from Western and Israeli paranoia rather than from an attempt to understand Chinese intentions / strategy / policy in the Middle East.
In the IMBA, at the University of Haifa, we train our students to analyze China's economic and business strategies.
At the level of global geopolitical analysis, it is obvious that, following the disastrous American-Chinese meeting in Anchorage, China seized the opportunity to thumb its nose at the Americans by showing that it could seriously reduce the impact of the American sanctions over Iran.
Arguably, that it remains at the declarative and politically symbolic level might raise, in some, an apprehension of future Chinese moves.
However, identifying the Treaty as a preliminary sign of a Chinese forced entry into the Middle East through the Shiite-Persian door (like the Soviet strategy in Egypt and Syria in 1955-1975) is showing little or no understanding at all of China's geostrategy and foreign policy.
Certainly, China’s primary global objective is to gain international recognition of its being a great Power on the international scene. Nonetheless, throughout its long history, the Chinese hegemonic ambitions have always been exclusively regional and restricted to its geographical environment.
Furthermore, nothing indicates that -in the years or decades to come-China will abandon its very cautious foreign policy and will get involved in the biggest and most dangerous international maze that is the Middle East.
Consequently, China might, indeed, seek to eliminate the American influence (and possibly in a foreseeable future, its military presence),but within the Western Pacific Rim (a sort of Monroe Doctrine with Chinese characteristics).
At the regional level, a closer examination of China's geopolitical and geo-economic interests and strategy in the Middle East, reveals that, as The Diplomat writes: «Despite the fanfare surrounding the agreement, something is still holding China-Iran relations back –whether that’s Chinese reluctance to tangle with Iran’s sanctions-ridden economy, Iranian fears of lost sovereignty, the complex geopolitics of the Middle East, or a combination of all three”.
Likewise, Bill Figueroa, who devoted his PhD thesis in History at the University of Pennsylvania to Sino-Iranian relations in the 20th century, notes that the agreement in question “is not a big deal”. It is, he writes, just a vague declaration of intentions without any figures, measurable objectives or specific cooperation programs. Mainly, everything that is in this treaty “already exists and in no way exceeds the standards of Chinese engagement with other countries in the region.”.
The Chinese engagement in the Middle East, in general, is purely economic and commercial (also technological with Israel) and this engagement is far superior with Sunni countries (and Israel) that China will certainly not want to antagonize.
“In short”, he concludes, this agreement is an attempt to bring Sino-Iranian relations “back in line with the rest of the Middle East”, rather than an expansion beyond the Chinese existing norm of engagement with the region. And we may add: it will take several years during which the Middle Eastern reality will again change as it has in the past decade.
To sum up, not only should Israel not see this Sino-Iranian document as an imminent or future danger, but on the contrary, Israel should continue to strengthen its good relations with the Chinese Power.